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LEBANON'S DISSOLUTION:  
FUTURES AND CONSEQUENCES



STAT

August 1976  
Final Report

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#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the exception of the Palestinian role in Lebanon and Lebanon's role (to include the Palestinians) in an Arab-Israeli confrontation, there appears to be no issue that is not subject to resolution by compromise. Most parties will settle for greater Muslim participation and representation in government. Most parties seem to agree that the Lebanese President would remain a Maronite, although some of his powers would be shared by a Prime Minister who would remain a Sunni and become more responsible to Parliament than to the President. Most parties also agree that greater representation of Muslims in the decision-making processes affecting military matters is needed (National Security type organization). And finally, most parties agree to greater Muslim officer representation and participation in decision-making processes of the Lebanese army (combined Chiefs-of-Staff type organization).

Nonetheless, it appears that a solution to Lebanon's crisis will be affected by:

1. the absence of a security force which, in the initial stages, will be able to separate the combatants and then gradually disarm them, thereby restoring some measure of security; and

2. the atmosphere of suspicion, communal strife, and the de facto partition of Lebanon into Christian and Muslim areas which will render the creation of a Lebanese security force difficult.

The next president of Lebanon will have to be acceptable to and enjoy the support and cooperation of all factions in order to be effective. At first, he will have to govern Lebanon with emergency powers; yet he cannot govern as a dictator, since the Muslim community will view that as a Christian attempt to rescind the understanding achieved through the new Covenant. The authors feel that a foreign security force, therefore, will be needed in the initial one-to two-year period to assist the new president in the task of restoring order, and must remain in Lebanon until a Lebanese security force can be created to assume the tasks performed by this foreign contingent.

As it affects Lebanon's laissez-faire policy, to include banking, compromise is possible if some degree of control is exercised by the government. The control sought is one that would ensure equitable taxation of the lower economic strata. The majority of the parties do not feel that the banks should be controlled any further.

Compromise is evident on the issue of distribution of wealth, with emphasis on Sunni and Shi'a sects and regions, with the understanding that the process would be gradual and evolutionary rather than radical and revolutionary. Although the issue of naturalization for Kurds, nomads, and overseas Lebanese appears to pit Left versus Right, a compromise is possible. A number of formulas can be developed which would open up naturalization for all for a limited and agreed upon period, after which the process would become selective on a case by case approach.

The Palestinians remain and will remain a problem until the relationship of the Palestinians with the Syrians is redefined and resolved. Until such time, the Palestinians will resist a Lebanese solution and will not attempt to control their Lebanese Leftist allies. The Lebanese Left, on the other hand, is not likely to accept compromise on the Palestinian issue which does not meet with the approval of the Palestinians, since their continued existence and future role in the Lebanese body politic depends to a great extent on a continued alliance with the Palestinians. Although greatly weakened by recent military setbacks and apparent non-support by the Arab governments (with the possible exception of Libya and Iraq), the Palestinians remain, nonetheless, a formidable force, which is able to exert pressure in Lebanon and Syria. At this moment, they appear to be willing to reach some understanding with the Syrians, an understanding which will guarantee them a large measure of independence. They feel, moreover, that time is on their side if the Syrian intervention in Lebanon continues much longer. Yet it must be noted that, even if the PLO is crushed in Lebanon, the Palestinian problem will not disappear. Instead, it may intensify since the PLO, as they have often threatened, may launch a terror campaign against real and perceived enemies, to include both international as well as regional targets.

## INTRODUCTION

Discussions [ ] concerning the situation in Lebanon and possible ensuing scenarios began in December 1975. Data collection proceeded on a large scale, and was to include the latest up-to-date material available. The scenarios, during the period covered by the contract, were revised to approximate possible developments as changes occurred in the Lebanese crisis. The last change in the set of scenarios took place on 1 June, when the Syrian government interjected its troops into Lebanon. The four scenarios represent the authors' best estimate of a possible future chronology of developments in Lebanon. The authors feel that the first scenario is likely to be the one that will most closely approximate the final denouement of the Lebanese crisis. However, taking into account earlier surprises, the authors feel that the other scenarios could approximate future developments in the crisis, should it be prolonged beyond the fall of this year and thus, deteriorate further.

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Data for this study was derived from the Arab newspaper sources-- An-Nahar, Ash-Sharq, and Al-Ahram--and from English sources-- An Nahar Arab Report, The Washington Post, and The New York Times. Furthermore, extensive interviews with leading Lebanese figures on both sides of the aisle, and with Jordanian and Syrian officials, were conducted by one of the authors.

Attention is drawn to the list of actors, acronyms and principal leaders in the chart entitled "Political Actors in the Lebanese Crisis: May 1976." Although they proliferate, especially on the Christian side, it does show those principal figures who have vehicles to which they could resort if a change of position was desired. Thus, Yasser Arafat, in his role as Fatah leader, was more moderate than Yasser

Bloc. It is important to understand in what capacity these leaders have spoken and continue to speak, in order to better understand the relative position of the different factions. The three charts which follow are presented to further facilitate the task of the reader. The first one shows the alignment of the factions in February 1975, just as the crisis began. The second one, dated May 1976, depicts the polarization of the factions; and here polarization is best represented by the number of combatants that form the backbone of either extreme. The third chart shows the alignment of forces after June 1, 1976, in terms of pro-and anti-Syrian allegiance. It is important to note in this last chart the fragmentation of the Left. It is this chart that leads the authors to believe that the first scenario is the one most likely to approximate the end of the Lebanese crisis.

POLITICAL ACTORS

ACTORS

ACRONYMS

Arab Liberation Front	ALF
Amal	AMAL
Armenian Traditional Leaders	ATL
Ba'ath, Iraqi Wing	BIW
Ba'ath, Syrian Wing	BSW
Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	DPFLP
Druze Traditional Leaders	DTL
Fatah	FATA
Front for Freedom and Man	FFM
Hanshakh	HAN
Independent Nasserist Movement	INM
Lebanese Arab Army	LAA
Liberal Bloc	LB
Lebanese Communist Party	LCP
Lebanese Independents	LI
Lebanese National Liberation Army	LNLA
Maronite Christian Traditional Leaders	MCTL
Maronite League	ML
Nahj	NAHJ
Najjadah	NAJ
National Bloc	NB
New Druze Elite	NDE
New Greek Orthodox Elite	NGOE
New Maronite Elite	NME
New Muslim Shi'ite Elite	NMSE
Nasserite Organization-Union of Working Forces	NOWF
National Progressive Forces	NPF
National Reform Movement	NRM
New Sunni Elite	NSE
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	PFLP
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command	PFLP-GC
Phalanges	PHAL
Palestine Liberation Army	PLA
Palestine Liberation Organization	PLO
Progressive Socialist Party	PSP
Saiqah	SAI
Shi'ite Muslim Traditional Leaders	SMTL
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	SSNP
Sunni Traditional Leaders	STL
Tashnag	TAS
The Left	TL
The Right	TR
Youth of Ali	YA

\*Member of Phalanges also.

## THE LEBANESE CRISIS: MAY 1976

ACRONYMSPRINCIPAL LEADERS

ALF Zaid Haydar  
 AMAL Imam Musa Sadr  
 ATL Papazian, Ablaghatian, Shader\*  
 BIW Ali al-Khalil, Farouk Muqqadam, Abdel Majid Raf'i  
 BSW Assim Qanso, A. al-Amin  
 DPFLP Naif Hawatmeh  
 DTL Kamal Jumblatt, Majid Arslan  
 FATA Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, Farouk Kaddoumi  
 FFM All Maronite leaders except R. Edde  
 HAN Yervant Darmerdjian (Financier, Dr. Varjabedian)  
 INM Ibrahim Kuleilat  
 LAA LT A. Khatib, CAPT H. Awad, MAJ Ahmad Ma'mari  
 LB Camille Chamoun, Daniel Chamoun  
 LCP George Hawi  
 LI AMAL, ATL, SMTL, NAHJ, M. Arslan, HAN, NGOE, TAS, STL  
 LNLA COL A. Barakat, Sulaiman Franjeh, Antoine Franjeh

MCTL P. Gemayel, C. Chamoun, R. Edde, E. Sarkis, C. Kassis,  
 Patriarch, S. Franjeh, A. Franjeh, M. Khoury,  
 Jean Aziz, P. Helou, C. Helou, Shaker Abu Sleiman

ML Charbel Kassis, Tanios Saba  
 NAHJ -----  
 NAJ Adnan Hakim  
 NB Raymond Edde  
 NDE Kamal Jumblatt  
 NGOE Ghasan Tweini, Col M. Kana'an  
 NME C. Kassis, T. Saba, A. Gemayel,  
 B. Gemayel, D. Chamoun  
 NMSE Imam M. Sadr H. Awad, H. Kana'an  
 A. Khalil

Elias Sarkis  
 Rashid Karame  
 COL M. Nassif  
 COL G. Lahoud &  
 Ex-members of G-2  
 Nahj Deputies from  
 Fouad Shehab Era

NOWF Kamal Shatilla, Najah Wakim  
 NPF -----  
 NRM -----  
 NSE I. Kuleilat, A. Khatib  
 PFLP G. Habash, Wadi Haddad  
 PFLP-GC Ahmad Gebril  
 PHAL P. Gemayel, A. Gemayel, B. Gemayel,  
 W. Hawi  
 PLA Mousbah Boudeiri  
 PLO Executive Committee  
 PSP Kamal Jumblatt  
 SAI Zuhair Muhsin  
 SMTL M. Hamade, K. As'ad, A. Ouseiran,  
 K. al-Khalil  
 SSNP Ina'am Raad, A. Saade, A. al-Ashkar

K. Jumblatt  
 I. Kuleilat  
 I. Raad  
 A. Saade  
 G. Habash  
 A. Gebril  
 A. Khalil  
 F. Muqqadam  
 A. M. Raf'i  
 Y. Arafat  
 S. Khalaf  
 F. Kadoumi  
 A. Khatib  
 G. Hawi


STL Mufti: S. Salam, R. Karami, R. Solh,  
 A. Dana, A. Hafez, T. Solh

Babikian  
 A. Yeramian  
 Khanamerian  
 Ablaghatian  
 Papazian  
 Setian


TAS NFP, NB  
 TL ML, LB, PHAL, LNLA  
 TR Ahmad Safwan  
 YA

Military  
 A. Ahdab, BG  
 F. Genadri, BG  
 G. Karam, COL  
 M. El Hajj, COL  
 G. Makhlouf, LTC  
 M. Abu al-Joude, BG  
 G. Gharib, COL  
 M. Mazbudi, COL  
 F. El Hajj, LTC  
 F. Abu Farhat, MAJ  
 H. Said, MG  
 S. Nassrallah, MG  
 M. Kana'an, BG  
 F. Racy, BG  
 J. Bustani, COL  
 F. Al-Khatib, COL  
 S. Assis, CAPT  
Civilian  
 PHAL LI  
 STL SMTL  
 NGOE ATL  
 HAN TAS  
 NB NAHJ  
 AMAL M. Arslan






ALIGNMENT OF FORCES -- MAY 1976



\* Because of fighting in Zahleh (predominantly Greek Catholics), the neutral position of this community has been compromised.

S - Tacit Support of Coup - not planners.



SCENARIOS

Scenario 1

"Syrian drive on the capital and occupation of all Leftist positions and elimination of anti-Syrian Leftists."

In this Scenario, the initial commitment of Syrian forces to achieve a cease-fire and restore security and stability is based on either of two options:

1. A thrust aimed at occupying all Leftist positions and enclaves no matter the cost;

2. A limited operation that will besiege Leftist and Palestinian forces in three main enclaves--Tripoli in the north; Aley-Sidon-Western Beirut triangle, while denying them use of the international airport, the major Beirut-Sidon road, and the port of Sidon; and Tyre in the south, thereby hoping to force the Leftist and Palestinian forces through means of a prolonged siege to accept Syrian terms for ending the fighting--while Syria resupplies and supports Rightist forces as a means of keeping constant pressure on the Leftists and Palestinians.

Further, while Syria believes the recourse to non-Lebanese forces to restore security and maintain stability in Lebanon to be necessary, the entry of non-Syrian Arab forces, or foreign forces, into Lebanon to perform that function is considered totally undesirable. Should such non-Syrian forces enter Lebanon, it is expected that Syria will resort to a series of measures which will in fact minimize the ineffectiveness of these forces, thereby, convincing all parties to the conflict, both internal and external, that Syria alone can restore security and stability in Lebanon. Acting as it has with its Christian allies, Syria has closed Beirut's international airport and seized all other major airports in the country. Also the major ports of Tyre, Sidon and Tripoli have been rendered ineffective, especially now that the Israeli blockade has been imposed on the southern ports. Syria has also shelled and put out of action the oil refinery at Sidon. The arrival of the logistical support for an Arab peace force will have to be made through Syria, giving that

country some control over this force. On the political and diplomatic fronts, Syria has fought and continues to fight a delaying rear-guard action aimed at undermining greater Arab government involvement, as seen by the recent Syrian/PLO agreement, although as yet unimplemented, which has succeeded in delaying Arab government interference.

#### Syrian Reasons for Intervention

On March 12, 1976, President Assad clarified his views on the Lebanese crisis and laid down Syria's reasons for intervening in the fighting. Assad made it clear that he does not consider the conflict to be one that pits the Right against the Left, or progressives against reactionaries, or one that pits those who demand reforms against those who refuse to accept them. He views the crisis "as a conspiracy against the people of Lebanon, and against the Palestinian revolution and against the Arab nation as a whole." At various times in earlier unofficial pronouncements, Assad accused the Palestinians of carrying out a plot by certain Arab governments aimed at liquidating those who opposed the American peace initiative in the Middle East. He made clear that Syria felt that security and stability in Lebanon were more important and urgent at the moment than the question of reforms and changes in the Lebanese system, most of which had already been agreed to by a majority earlier. He further warned the Palestinians to take a neutral stand and to dissociate themselves from the Progressive National Movement and Kamal Jumblatt (whom Assad considers responsible for the latest round of fighting), and made it clear that although Lebanon was an Arab problem, Syria alone bore the responsibility for security and stability in Lebanon.

Let everyone know and understand that in this region we have complete freedom of movement. We can take any position we deem suitable; no one can prevent us from doing so.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Syrian Plan

The Syrian Plan appears to be two-phased:

1. Secure the election and installation of their favorite candidate, Elias Sarkis, implement the reforms agreed to and radio broadcast by President Franjieh (see below) and conclude a "Security and Cooperation" agreement similar to the one concluded with Jordan.<sup>2</sup>
2. Syrian forces acting on the request of the new Lebanese president and cabinet of national unity would then assume two roles:
  - a. disarm the population and help in the reunification and reconstitution of the Lebanese army and security forces; and,
  - b. insure the implementation of the Cairo Agreement of 1969.<sup>3</sup>

The Syrian reasons for intervention and the Syrian Plan seem to enjoy the support of most of the internal parties to the conflict, with the exception of the extreme Right ("Cedar Guard" and the Order of the Maronite Monks), and some elements of the extreme Left. The extreme Right, however, can choose to be overruled when it allows the Front for Freedom and Man, of which it is a member, to speak for the Maronites as a whole, and therefore, tacitly supports the Syrian move since the Maronite Christian traditional leaders are in favor of the Syrian initiative. The Left has fragmented over the Syrian military intervention, with the al-Najjadah Party, Saiqah, the Ba'ath, Syrian Wing, and the Nasserite Organization-Union of Working Forces, supporting the Syrians. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (Ina'am Raad wing) chose to take a middle-of-the-road position, while the rest, to include all the Palestinian guerrilla groups, condemned it. It is clear, however, that once the PLO comes to terms with Syria, opposition to the Syrian role in Lebanon will become negligible.

#### Domestic Effects

1. Greater Muslim Representation and Participation in Governmental Process

On February 14, 1976, President Franjieh addressed a message to the nation which embodies the new National Covenant. This National Covenant was achieved after a series of meetings among traditional Christian Maronite leaders, traditional Sunni Muslim leaders, and traditional

Shi'ite Muslim leaders, to include Imam Musa Sadr and Syrian officials. In essence, the new National Covenant makes the following points and changes in the traditional structure:

(1) There will be equal representation by Muslims and Christians in Parliament--54 to 54 deputies for each side. Presently, the Shi'ites have only 19 deputies as opposed to 20 Sunnis. The new Covenant calls for 9 additional Muslim deputies, of which 3 will be Shi'ite and 4 Sunni. Two will be Druze, thus maintaining a 24 to 22 majority in favor of the Sunnis, with the Druze increasing from the present total of 6 to 8 members. (This point has not been fully accepted by the Shi'ites who want equal representation with the Sunnis.)

(2) The Prime Minister will be nominated by Parliament rather than by the President, as was the usage under the old National Covenant. The authority of the President and the Prime Minister remains to be defined. Most likely, the Prime Minister will be given more executive power independent of consent of the President.

(3) A constitutional court will be created to pass on existing laws, and a supreme court will also be created to try the President and Ministers in case of unconstitutional or unlawful conduct.

(4) A new council will be established to supplement the present Council of Deputies. It is not clear whether this council will be set up to deal with economics in general, economic planning, or for the economic development of districts.

(5) Confessionalism will be abolished from state employment. Future governmental appointments will be made on the basis of specialization and qualification.

(6) The document stressed the fact that "Lebanon is an independent, free Arab country." Lebanon's Arab identity has never in the past been so officially stressed.

(7) The presidency, premiership, and speaker of the House will remain the preserve of Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shi'ites respectively. On this issue, there seems to be some disagreement. Some traditional Sunni Muslim leaders seem to feel that this should not be specifically stated in the Covenant, but should follow the practice adopted earlier in the previous National Covenant where this classification



was tacitly accepted, thereby attempting to bridge the gap between extreme Maronite demands that this be stressed in the Covenant and the refusal of some traditional Sunni Muslim leaders to sign such a Covenant. Prime Minister Karami stated that "one who is not bound by his word is not bound by his signature."<sup>4</sup>

(8) Relationships between Palestinians and Lebanese will be strictly regulated in accordance with the Cairo Accords; and Syria will act to guarantee full implementation of this agreement. The Syrians feel "that if the Cairo Agreement is implemented scrupulously, especially concerning the ban on armed men walking in the streets and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from refugee camps in Lebanon, some of the major causes of friction between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinians will be removed."<sup>5</sup>

In a statement in February 1976, Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Phalange Party, said that he accepted the Cairo Agreement of 1969 in spite of himself so as to save the country from civil war. The Phalangists, he stated, waited five years "accepting the most humiliating concessions before taking a step."<sup>6</sup>

(9) Once the cease-fire goes into effect, there will be economic and social reforms aimed at improving the lot of the Lebanese people. But this would be left to the Cabinet of National Reconciliation or Union to determine the portent of such reforms.

(10) Amendment of the citizenship clause, undefined as yet.

This new National Covenant, though, does not have the support of the Progressive National Forces (PNF). Kamal Jumblatt has reiterated his demands for a total laicization of the Lebanese political system and has stated his opposition to the concept of consecrating the Presidency of the Republic to the Maronite sect. Also, Mr. Jumblatt has stated his opposition to the election of Elias Sarkis, because he feels that Sarkis has the support of the Syrians and that the Syrians want to limit the reforms of this new National Covenant. On the other hand, since the election of Sarkis and in order to avoid a confrontation with him, Mr. Jumblatt has moderated his position and has set two conditions for cooperation with Sarkis: the withdrawal of Syrian troops, and the implementation of reforms, even though minimal.

The extreme Maronite wing, as represented by the "Cedar Guards"--generally associated with the Maronite League and the Order of Maronite Monks--rejected the following points in President Franjieh's document:

- (1) Lebanon's Arab identity;
- (2) repudiation of the Cairo Agreement and the rejection of a Palestinian presence on Lebanese soil;
- (3) sectarianism, demanding instead the total secularization of the Lebanese state;\* and
- (4) opening up naturalization to non-Lebanese. They stated that "Any civilized country allows 6% of its total population to be strangers, whereas Lebanon has 57%."<sup>7</sup> However, the Front for Freedom and Man, which incorporates all the Maronite leadership of the country, to include the Phalangists, is believed to hold similar views as regards the new National Covenant as that of the Phalangists who praised it. The Front for Freedom and Man believes that the new National Covenant forms a suitable basis for national understanding.

Judging by the number of casualties on both sides, it would appear that Lebanese Christian and Muslim losses have been light in comparison to those of the Palestinians. In other words, most of the casualties have been Palestinians; thus mutual hatred of the two major Lebanese communities, generated by the number of lives lost, can be minimized. In terms of material losses, the Christians have suffered the most; but they are in a better position to recoup their losses once the fighting subsides.

Finally, since the Lebanese Left is split between pro- and anti-Syrian factions, and is not broadly based, a Christian gambit to seek partition will put the Sunni traditional leadership in a quandary. A Lebanese Muslim state would be controlled by either Palestinians or Leftists or a Druze leader (Kamal Jumblatt) who is bent on secularization. These three options are not relished by the traditional Sunni leaders and may impel them to seek some compromise with the Christian leadership

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\*A subtle difference exists between demands for the laicization of the state and total secularization. By demanding total secularization, the extreme Maronite wing hopes to put the Muslims on the spot since it will abolish the religious courts and will allow interfaith--Christian-Muslim-- marriages, especially the marriages of Muslim women with Christian men which is expressly forbidden by the Qur'an. Thus, the extreme Maronite wing hopes that the demands for laicization will be dropped by

as can be seen by the recent meeting between Saeb Salam and Bashir Gemayel. This is also based on information that the relationship between Lebanese Muslims and Palestinians in the western part of Beirut has begun to sour. Therefore, if one accepts the fact that Lebanese Christian and Muslim casualties have not been catastrophic, that the Christians are prepared to absorb their economic losses, and that traditional Muslim leaders have no option but to seek a compromise with the Christians in order to preserve their positions, one can conclude that reconciliation is still possible, especially if the Muslim community will derive greater political gain from such a move, and if conservative Arab governments, ie. Saudi Arabia, are prepared to finance the traditional Muslim leaders in a bid to win back their electorate while, at the same time, making reparations for Muslim economic losses.

One has to note that neither the Christians nor the Muslims have been able to impose a military solution on the other, thereby enabling the old formula of "no winner, no loser" to be used as a basis for compromise. Moreover, it is likely that the traditional Christian Muslim leaders' will use the Palestinians as a scapegoat, especially if the relationship of the Muslim to the Palestinians continues to deteriorate, and continued fighting between the Rightists and the Palestinians further weakens the latter. The beginning of this trend is evident if one considers the fact that the crisis began as a Christian-Muslim fight, progressing to a Leftist-Rightist struggle, and now is portrayed as a Syrian/Rightist-Palestinian conflict. In other words, the Lebanese Muslims are no longer a prominent party to the conflict, which now pits Syria and its Rightist allies against the Palestinians.

2. Reconstruction of a Lebanese Army, with Greater Muslim Representation in the Officer Corps.

Plans for an expansion of the Lebanese Army to five or six brigades, totalling 35- to 40,000 men, have been considered for the past four years. It was felt that this would be sufficient to maintain internal security in face of growing Palestinian/Leftist strength and would be a credible

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by the Muslims if it means opening the secular Pandora's box. (For an interesting explanation of a moderate Muslim's point of view on secularization and laicization, see: Mahmasani Subhi, "A Legal Interpretation of Secularism," Al-Hawadess (in Arabic), 23 April 1976, No. 1015, pp. 24-25.)

deterrent to Israeli raids into Lebanon.\* Several factors, however, affected the implementation of such a plan, such as the negative attitude of Parliament to enact legislation creating the proposed army, and the inability of the Lebanese army to attract volunteers, especially from the Christian community.

In the past two years, the army found itself the constant subject of criticism, especially from Muslim, Leftist, and Palestinian sources, for doing little to defend southern Lebanon and the Palestinian camps from Israeli attacks. A request by Premier Saeb Salam to General Iskandar Ghanem, then army commander, for the Lebanese army to provide cover for Palestinian infiltrators and for the defense of the Palestinian camps, led to a break between Sunni leaders and the army command. Subsequently, Sunni leaders demanded a greater say in decisions affecting national defense policies and promotion within the army. More recently, the Sunni Prime Ministers have taken for themselves the defense portfolio. Also they have demanded that decisions affecting national defense be referred to a body resembling the United States National Security Council, in which greater Muslim representation gives the Muslims a greater say. This proposed National Security Council was supposed to limit the powers of the president and the army commander in deciding matters affecting national defense. The Muslim leadership, moreover, demanded the creation of a Superior Officers Council, similar to the United States' Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, in which the number of Muslim officers would be increased.<sup>8</sup> This Superior Officers Council would be responsible for matters affecting the army itself in such areas as recruitment, armament, equipment, promotion, strategy and tactics. This was seen as a way of limiting the authority of the army commander in such matters since the

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\*It is recognized by the authors that Israel will not react passively to such an increase in numbers and will attempt to pressure Lebanon, through the United States, to keep the army to its former size. It may use the 45,000 figure as justification for additional US military aid to Israel. This point will be discussed further in Scenario 4B.

army commander, the G-2, and the head of the Interior Security forces are all Christian Maronites.

Because of the poor performance of the Lebanese army during the Lebanese crisis and the ultimate disintegration of this army, Christian confidence in the future role of the Lebanese army has evaporated. Thus, it is unlikely that the army will attract many Christians to its ranks, especially if the Syrians are going to have a say in its reconstruction, rearmament, and re-equipment. The Christians would prefer that a new Lebanese army be reconstituted along confessional lines, with Christian units located in Christian areas and Muslim units located in Muslim areas. Coordination between these units would be done at regiment, brigade, and army headquarters levels. The Syrians do not seem to be enthused about this plan since it will create a form of partition. Instead, they seem to be recreating a new Lebanese army along its old lines of mixed confessional units, as can best be ascertained by the "Vanguards of the Lebanese Arab Army" now operating in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.

Most likely, once the cease-fire has taken place, the new Cabinet of National Reconciliation will issue a general amnesty for all members of the armed forces and Internal Security forces, and urge them to rejoin their units. The amnesty may not cover principal commanders of the Lebanese Arab Army (LT Ahmad Khatib) and the Lebanese National Liberation Army (COL Antoine Barakat). While no official charges may be brought against these two officers, a decision concerning their fate will be postponed, in the hope that they may be encouraged to resign their commissions. These two officers probably would be encouraged to seek a political role by running as candidates for Parliament once the situation in Lebanon stabilizes and national Parliamentary elections are called.

The Syrians, furthermore, will implement the Muslim demands for a National Security Council and a Superior Officers Council. Also, since most of the Christian senior officers are likely to retire rather than remain on active service, greater Muslim representation in the officer corps will be assured since wholesale promotions from the ranks where Muslims predominate will take place. The Syrians will, through Elias

Sarkis, rely on the appointment of an army commander who is well disposed toward Syria and who can maintain confessional balance in the army units. This new army commander and the Superior Officers Council and most brigade commanders will probably be drawn from the ranks of the old Nahj (politicians and officers associated with the Fuad Shehab regime). It is not clear at this moment whether the army commander will remain a Maronite or whether, to achieve a confessional balance, the commander of both the army and the Internal Security forces will be assigned to a Maronite and a Sunni respectively or vice versa. Leading contenders for either position are Colonel Michel Nassif, Colonel Ahmad al-Hajj (both close associates of Elias Sarkis), and Colonel Gabriel Lahoud. Representation in the Superior Officers Council and brigade commanders will go to the former members of the Nahj or those associated with it under Presidents Shehab and Helou. It must be remembered that a number of these officers fled and sought refuge in Syria when then Prime Minister Saeb Salam brought charges of misconduct against them, and that Syrian officials played a major role in the subsequent dismissal of these charges and their reinstatement in the Lebanese army.

If a security cooperation agreement with Lebanon is signed, the Syrians most likely will want to withdraw their forces from Lebanon as quickly as possible and yet be assured that the regime of Sarkis is not only stable and can maintain law and order in the country, but also remains pro-Syrian. Thus, the Syrians can be expected to push for a hasty reconstitution and expansion of the Lebanese army and Interior Security forces and may encourage Shi'ite males, who belong to Imam Musa Sadr's faction, and Christians to volunteer for service in the armed forces. Should the Syrians encounter difficulty in attracting a sufficient number of volunteers for either economic or financial reasons--the limitation on the budget of the Lebanese government and low pay of recruits--it is likely that they will push for a national draft using their pay scale or that of French recruits as a formula which may help them overcome the financial budgetary constraints which the Lebanese government is likely to find itself in once the fighting stops.

Equipment and armaments for this expanded Lebanese army will be acquired from Syrian stocks, or the Syrians may approach one of the oil-rich Gulf states to purchase the needed arms and equipment from France for this new Lebanese army. In any event, the Syrians are expected to have a say in its future.

### 3. The Palestinians in Lebanon.

It is clear from repeated Syrian pronouncements that they expect the Cairo Accord of 1969 to be the instrument which regulates the relationship of the Palestinians guerrilla movement with the Lebanese authorities, and the Syrians as guarantors that the Accord will be strictly observed by both sides.

It is equally clear that a number of Palestinian organizations--PFLP, PFLP-GC, ALF--reject the Cairo Accord and have openly violated its terms. Until the latest Syrian involvement in Lebanon, the Syrian government has been able to rely on Fatah, Saiqah, and the DPFLP to keep the "Rejectionists"\* within bounds. However, since the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon on June 1st, the split between Syria and Saiqah on the one hand, and Fatah, PFLP, ALF, PFLP-GC, and DPFLP on the other, has widened to the point where the Syrians have questioned and refused to recognize Arafat as head of the Executive Committee of the PLO.<sup>9</sup>

Although all Palestinian guerrilla groups with the exception of Saiqah joined forces with the Lebanese Leftists to actively oppose the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, it is clear that Syria considers Fatah, the PFLP, and the ALF as the principal culprits. It is likely that Syria will attempt to liquidate the ALF and the Ba'ath, Iraqi wing entirely, while trying to effect changes in the leadership of Fatah and the PFLP. Because of a long standing history of friction between the PFLP and the Syrians, George Habash will be obliged to move his opera-

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\*The Rejectionists are those groups which oppose a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. Originally, they were PFLP, PFLP-GC and ALF.

tions from Beirut to Baghdad or Tripoli (Libya). In all probability, Yasser Arafat will be allowed to remain in Lebanon and to continue as head of the PLO; but it is clear that Saiqah will have the upper hand in Lebanon and will be used to keep Fatah, PFLP-GC, and the DPFLP under control. As far as Lebanon is concerned, it is clear that Zuhair Muhsin, the head of Saiqah, will be the paramount Palestinian leader.

Once a Syrian-approved Lebanese army is established, Saiqah, therefore, will act to enforce adherence by the Palestinian camps to the Cairo Accord with the support if needed of this new Lebanese army.

In spite of the fact that the Palestinian camps of Tal Zaatar, Jisr al-Basha, Dikwaneh, and Dbayeh east and northeast of Beirut have been overrun by the Phalangists; in spite of the fact that Shatilla, Bourj al-Barajneh, and Sabra camps south of Beirut have been emptied because of Saiqah/Syrian shelling; in spite of the fact that the remaining camps of Nahr al-Barid and Badawi near Tripoli, Mieh Mieh, Ayn al-Hilweh, and Nabatieh camps near Sidon, Wavell camp in the Bekaa, and southeast Lebanon--Marjayoun, Nabatieh, Rashaya, and the Arkoub--have been surrounded by Syrian troops or are within Syrian artillery range; and in spite of the fact that the Palestinians have suffered high casualty rates and their ranks have been depleted by migrations to Syria, Jordan and the West Bank--they remain a formidable force, as can be seen by the fighting in Sidon between the Syrian and Palestinian/Leftist forces. They have fallen back on the major Lebanese cities of Tyre, Sidon, Western Beirut, and Tripoli to make a final stand in what appears to be a decision to engage the Syrians in house-to-house fighting, which not only would be costly in human and material resources, but would not be acceptable psychologically to the Arab masses. Obviously, the Palestinians hope to use this tactic as a way of denying Syrian/Rightist control over these major cities, a factor which would be vital to a Syrian-imposed settlement. Furthermore, this tactic, coupled with that of hit-and-run strikes against the Syrian forces, would give the Palestinians/Leftists time which they believe acts in their favor, since it is felt that a prolonged armed Syrian intervention in Lebanon will



adversely affect the Syrian economy and Syria's development program, the "Achilles' heel," they believe, of Hafez Assad.

One, moreover, has to consider the implications of Palestinian terrorism aimed not only at Israel but at Arab governments as well. The threat to use terrorism against Arab regimes already has been made. The Palestinians hope that this threat will result in Arab pressures on the Syrian government to modify its anti-Palestinian policy, to the extent that it will give the Palestinians in Lebanon enough freedom from Syrian control to be able to operate as they did in the past.

#### 4. Fragmenting the Left

The fragmentation of the NPF actually began prior to the Syrian military intervention, and was completed with the Syrian military intervention of June 1. An alignment of Leftist forces divided between pro-Syrians and anti-Syrians reveals the following:

Pro-Syrian: Saiqah, Ba'ath, Syrian Wing, Syrian Social Nationalist Party (Ashkar group), Nasserite Organization-Union of Working Forces (Shatilla), the movement of Shi'ite leader Imam Musa Sadr (Amal), Najjadah group (Adnan al-Hakim) and the Faruq Muqaddam group in Tripoli.

Anti-Syrian: Progressive Socialist Party, Syrian Social Nationalist Party (Ina'am Raad), Ba'ath, Iraqi Wing, Lebanese Communist Party, Independent Nasserist Movement, Lebanese Arab Army, Youth of Ali, new Sunni elite, new Muslim Shi'ite elite, new Druze elite, and the Druze traditional elite. It is expected that Syrian influence on the regime of Elias Sarkis will result in support for pro-Syrian forces and in the fragmentation of anti-Syrian forces. Once the Palestinian guerrilla groups are brought under control (see above), and the Lebanese army is reconstituted, the National Progressive Forces will be deprived of much of its fire power. Because of the ideological split, it is expected that a secret war will continue between the Ba'ath, Iraqi wing and the Ba'ath, Syrian wing, and Syrian/Sarkis pressure during the forthcoming elections will attempt to deprive the Ba'ath, Iraqi wing of its two deputies--Raf'i (Sunni) and A. Khalil (Shi'ite)--and insure the election of a Shi'ite replacement more in line with Musa Sadr group (Amal) and a Sunni more in line with Karami's new alliance with Faruq Muqaddam.

The Independent Nasserist Movement in the person of its leader, Ibrahim Kuleilat, will be given the choice of shifting sides, thereby supporting the Syrian/Sarkis regime in exchange for a seat in Parliament, or, if not, being isolated. Most observers feel that he is likely to change sides and seek a formalization of his role as a Lebanese deputy. In other words, it is expected that he will be amenable to being brought into the system.<sup>10</sup>

The Ashkar wing of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party reconciled, too, with the Syrian Ba'ath Party.<sup>11</sup> Even the Ina'am Raad faction is not entirely opposed to the Syrian intervention; but because of its ideological platform, it supports instead a joint Iraqi/Syrian/PLO/Lebanese rapprochement and a concerted effort to bring the Lebanese crisis to an end, within what it refers to as the Greater Syria concept.

The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) poses the greatest problem for the Syrians. Kamal Jumblatt acts both as a traditional Druze leader, bringing to the PSP a large Druze following, and as a prominent Socialist leader who attracts both Christian and Muslim followers from within the intellectual/student/blue collar worker groups. In part, Kamal Jumblatt's rise to power is due to the failing health of Majid Arslan, the other traditional Druze leader, and the unwillingness of Sulaiman Franjieh and previous ex-presidents to promote prominent Druze alternate leaders from the upper nobility (mashayik), such as the Talhouks and the Ala'muddins. Recently and since the Syrian military intervention, Majid Arslan, with the apparent support of the Syrians, has begun to reassert his claim to Druze leadership by bitterly and openly criticizing all who oppose the Syrian intervention.<sup>12</sup>

If Kamal Jumblatt and the PSP can be split from the other component members of the National Progressive Forces, and if the regime of Elias Sarkis chooses to support other Druze leaders during the forthcoming Parliamentary elections (when and if they do take place), then it is obvious that Kamal Jumblatt's power would be reduced. If the Druze community concludes that his continued leadership is likely to create for them hardship, both political and economic, it is expected that they

will shift their allegiance to new Druze leaders (see preceding paragraph), more amenable and more closely aligned with the new order of things in Lebanon. Certainly, it is evident that the Syrians are determined to crush Kamal Jumblatt.

5. Redistribution of Wealth, with Emphasis on Shi'ite and Sunni Regions

To win over the Sunnis and to insure continued Shi'ite support, both the Syrians and Elias Sarkis will insist on giving the predominantly Shi'ite and Sunni areas of Lebanon--the Akkar, Hermel, Nabatieh/Marjayoun regions and the areas abutting the Israel border--priority. Elias Sarkis is on record as strongly favoring a concerted effort for the implementation of an economic and social modernization plan for these areas which will emphasize road building, schools, electrification, hospitals, irrigation projects, and technical assistance to farmers. Since the independence of Lebanon, the Akkar region and the Hermel have been on the fringes of Lebanese society, and have been plagued with continuous low level turmoil. Through development, it is hoped that dissension will decrease or cease in these regions. Reforms and the much needed development of the southern and eastern regions of Lebanon, however, will be slow in coming.

6. Greater Government Control of the Economy: Banking, Services, Construction and Business Institutions

Although the banking sector which has turned Lebanon into a commercial and financial center has been seriously affected, surprisingly banking and business circles believe that the damage is not irreparable and the prospects are favorable for a return to its previous position once the fighting has stopped. The following reasons are given for this optimistic view:

(1) The absence of a suitable substitute. In the 17 months of fighting, several non-Arab centers (Athens, Teheran, and Istanbul) and some Arab cities (Cairo, Bahrain, Kuwait, Amman, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi) have not developed as suitable replacements for Beirut, because of one or more of the following factors:

Political stability, liberal banking and commercial legislation without restrictions on external operations, good hotel accommodations, regular communications services, extensive air connections to other cities, a developed infrastructure, and acceptable social and leisure amenities.<sup>13</sup>

(2) The level of social sophistication. This, in comparison to the above mentioned alternative cities, is "held in very high regard by foreign concerns, and according to some international businesses and banking concerns, past experience has taught them that this 'precious' element is found in the Middle East only in Beirut."<sup>14</sup>

(3) The stability of the Lebanese pound. With its gold and foreign hard currency coverage, the Lebanese pound has never during the course of the crisis depreciated in value more than 9.8%. "It was noted in Beirut that the exchange rate of the dollar remained remarkably stable."<sup>15</sup>

(4) Lebanese adaptability. In the past, the Lebanese laissez-faire and entrepreneurial spirit has been connoted with latent materialism. However, the propensity of the Lebanese to adapt to difficult conditions are considered a major factor in whatever hopes there are for a speedy reconstruction.<sup>16</sup>

The banks, nevertheless, face serious problems:

(1) The inflow of capital deposits has come to a complete standstill after reaching a ceiling of LL9.4 billion in the summer of 1975. Since then an estimated LL1.2 billion has been transferred abroad.

(2) Banks have been unable to extend usual credits and facilities to the private sector. Many businessmen have used their overdraft privileges and, in the process of continued fighting and destruction, have been unable to turn over this money at the necessary rate to make repayment of loans and interest possible. In the case of a fairly large number of these trading institutions, the only options open to them would be bankruptcy, receivership or a moratorium on repayment. In any case, and especially where bankruptcy is declared, the collateral used by these trading institutions (normally real estate) is so depressed that

the banks will suffer great losses, even if they choose to foreclose. This is more likely to affect the smaller and purely Lebanese-owned banks than it is the major ones. The Central Bank, in its turn, will have to decide whether to support these smaller banks or see them closed.

(3) Most banks including the large ones favor a moratorium on payments and receipts, to be concluded jointly between them and the Central Bank Governor. However, the Central Bank has made it clear that it is opposed to restrictive legislation concerning withdrawals, transfers, payments, and receipts since this would "preclude any return to normal financial conditions in the country for a prolonged period of time,"<sup>17</sup> and would seriously affect the chances of Lebanon returning to its previous position as an important financial and commercial center. A compromise appears possible since most of these banks have continued to operate through their branches in either the Christian or Muslim areas of Lebanon (only the headquarter offices in the banking district of Beirut have closed). Some of them have either opened branches in some of the Arab countries mentioned above or in France or Belgium, or have operated internationally through affiliates. Thus, a compromise would seem to be more psychologically than financially motivated, the purpose being to convince the banks that stability has returned and that they could begin to operate out of their Beirut headquarters once again. All of this is predicated on stability, a restoration of basic services, such as telephones, telex, and air travel, and resumption of efficient electric and water supplies, the clearing of garbage, and the availability of apartments, schools, and other such amenities.

It appears that the Syrians are very interested in having Beirut resume its traditional banking and financial role. Furthermore, most of the bankers are optimistic, since Elias Sarkis, as Governor of the Central Bank, was instrumental in streamlining the banking system in Lebanon in the aftermath of the Intra crisis and the rash of bank failures that followed. Elias Sarkis is known as a proponent of efficient and responsive banking.<sup>18</sup>

As far as the other sectors are concerned, the government, in early winter, had undertaken a program to revitalize agriculture, industry, tourism and the construction business. It voted LL100 million to be given

to the Banque de Credit Agricole Industriel et Foncier for distribution in the form of 20-year loans to those whose houses and buildings have been damaged or destroyed. A ceiling of LL100,000 has been set for such loans; two percent interest will be charged for loans up to LL40,000, and six percent will be levied for loans ranging between LL40,000 and LL100,000.

The Council of Ministers decided during the first week of March that LL400 million will be given to the Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Industriel et Touristique for long-term loans (with equally low rates of interest) for 'economic institutions' and universities to enable them to become operational once again.<sup>19</sup>

It is clear that these were pitifully low figures, given the capital asset loss of LL20 billion; and given the recent devastation in the wake of the fighting which took place after March 1976, it is clear that something more drastic is needed. Nonetheless, the key indicator of Lebanon's chances of overcoming its economic crisis is the ability of the banking system to come back.

Businessmen in general do not admire Elias Sarkis since it is known that he favors tighter controls over business and supports stringent plans to reform the internal revenue system of Lebanon with the view of securing an equitable return on the profits of Lebanese businessmen.<sup>20</sup> However, because of the economic crisis, such reforms will be planned but not executed until Lebanon has recovered some of its commercial elan. To impose such measures now would frighten the commercial community and push it to turn their temporary headquarters in all parts of the world into permanent headquarters.

Locally, the Lebanese businessmen most likely will adopt very guarded and hesitant measures. They will want to assess the Syrian role in Lebanon, the results of the parliamentary elections, and the ability of the government to provide security. Thus, in the first year or so after

the fighting comes to an end, they will attempt to liquidate whatever remaining stocks are available in safe warehouses, while maintaining fluidity. In part, their unwillingness to resume normal trade (import) is based on the fact that it will take the port of Beirut and shipping companies months to sort out the problems arising from it being closed to shipping which made it necessary to divert goods to alternate ports. Also, the prolonged crisis has reduced the buying power of the average Lebanese which, in turn, has altered both their buying patterns and habits in terms of priority. Finally, these businessmen will have to await the return of close to half-a-million Lebanese who represent a substantial market.

The above factors will exacerbate the economic problems of a new cabinet. Most of the revenues of the state come from customs, and a reduction in imports will deprive the government of the needed revenues to deal with a rebuilding process. Also, a reduction of trade and the maintenance of a liquid position will mean a continued rate of high unemployment, which in turn, will affect both the social and political fabric of the country.<sup>21</sup>

#### 7. Controlled Press

Controls over the press and effective censorship were greatly reduced under the regimes of Presidents Helou and Franjieh, although two rules were enforced: criticism of Arab countries, and attacks on Arab leaders and the offices of the Lebanese presidency and premiership. These two censorship rules were, nonetheless, by-passed by the press by reprinting, verbatim, critical reports from the wire services of other papers, or by resorting to the Lebanese subterfuge of writing between the lines.

A survey by one of the authors of well-known Lebanese editors, politicians, businessmen, high government functionaries, and army officers, revealed a tendency to blame the press for exacerbating the conflict. Cited were: the multiplicity of newspapers with practically no *raison d'etre* and no real readership, whose existence depended on subsidies from a number of Arab states; irresponsible editorializing and editors; rumormongering; and inaccurate reporting of facts which bordered on deliberate slanting.

Given the above, given the fact that the press controls had been strictly enforced during the Nahj regime of President Shehab, and given Syrian propensity to deal harshly with opposition newspapers--as can be judged by the Saiqah attacks on al-Muharrir and Beirut--coupled with the strict control of their own press, it is likely that press controls will be reestablished during the Sarkis regime, and that a number of anti-Syrian papers, especially those being funded by the Ba'ath, Syrian wing, will be driven out of business by the imposition of strict rules concerning ownership, sources of revenue, board of directors, size of paper (8-14 pages as a minimum), etc. Newspapers such as an-Nahar, al-Amal (Phalanges), al-Hayyat (Shi'ite), Orient-Le Jour, Daily Star, al-Anwar, and ash-Sharq (Ba'ath, Syrian wing) will continue to operate, but will in all probability have to be very restrained even when resorting to "writing between the lines."

#### Regional and Systemic Effects

Unsure of Egyptian motives, suspicious of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's willingness to bring about a solution to the Israeli-Syrian conflict and the Palestinian problem, convinced that the step-by-step approach has run its course, and fearing an Israeli preemptive strike, Syria moved, with the signing of the second-stage disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel, to create new facts. These facts are designed to reduce Israel's military options and afford Syria some measure of security against an Israeli preemptive strike, wrest the initiative from Egypt, pressure the United States, Israel and the international community into exerting greater efforts toward an overall settlement, and create a viable economic and political entity which could compete on an equal footing with its perceived adversaries (Iraq) and friends in the region.

##### 1. The Lebanese Crisis and the Palestinians

From the start, the Syrian government maintained that the conflict in Lebanon was connected with the Sinai Agreement and with attempts to weaken it politically and militarily.\* This explains its continued

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\*Hafez Assad stressed these points in a lengthy speech he gave in Damascus in July (See: FBIS-MEA, Vol. V, No. 141, 21 July 1976), p. H-3.)



assertion that Lebanon is essential to Syrian security. Furthermore, the Assad regime believed that the solution to the crisis rested on political and constitutional arrangements which would preserve the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. To achieve these goals, Syria professed neutrality and offered to mediate. However, initially, Syria did, in fact, align itself with the Leftists in Lebanon. Most of the arms and ammunition found in Leftist stock-piles came from Syria.

Syria's motives for supporting the Leftists were: to weaken the Christian Rightists, thereby reducing them to a level of parity with the Muslim Leftists so as to make the reform of the political system attainable, and to induce all parties to accept Syria's mediation efforts, thereby boosting its influence in Lebanon. This policy, however, did not work because it increased the power of the Leftists, who became increasingly uncompromising. The Rightists, on the other hand, feeling their power at an ebb, began to talk of partition.

Syria opposed the partition plan and expressed its position to U.S. Undersecretary of State Alfred Atherton during his visit to Damascus in December 1975. At the same time, it became alarmed when certain extremist groups among the Leftists escalated the fighting, with what was believed to be Iraqi backing. If unchecked, escalation, President Assad believed, would certainly lead to partition, an action that would serve Israel strategically and ideologically.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, partition would frustrate Syria's Eastern Front defense strategy. To press home the point against partition, the Syrian Foreign Minister made a statement in which he said: "Lebanon was part of Syria, and we shall annex it back following any real attempt to divide it."<sup>23</sup> This statement infuriated many Lebanese. Syria, however, was not actually seeking to annex Lebanon; instead, it was only iterating its opposition to partition.

Syria's plan of action regarding the Lebanese crisis took an important turn after former French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, who came to Lebanon to mediate, suggested to President Assad that he

invite the leader of the Phalangist Party, Pierre Gemayel, to Damascus to discuss with him the Rightists' position. The Leftists condemned the Syrian invitation. Syria, nevertheless, felt that it was time for a more balanced role. Gemayel's interests coincided with those of President Assad on many points, but especially on one, namely: that if the Christians were to be weakened further in Lebanon, the Muslim majority would gain the upper hand, a factor that would not serve the interests of the Syrian President and his minority Alawite ruling group. Therefore, the preservation of the Christian position in Lebanon would maintain a religious balance and would keep Muslim power within definable limits. To this end, Syria forwarded a reform plan and peace initiative which Gemayel accepted.

Syria's efforts to bring about a cease-fire was initiated when the alliance of progressive forces (Leftists and Palestinians) seemed to be scoring significant military victories over their opponents. Yet Leftist leadership was willing to opt for a cease-fire and a reform program. Although Syria's program incorporated most of the Leftists' demands, their leaders accepted it with reservation.<sup>24</sup> However, when it became evident that Syria was opting for a military stalemate, Jumblatt reactivated the battlefield, and announced his intention to control Mount Lebanon "from Zghorta [the president's hometown] to Jezzín [the electoral limits of Jumblatt's constituency]"<sup>26</sup> That statement created a definite turning point in Syria's position toward the Leftists and Palestinians.

Syria began to introduce into Lebanon some military units to enforce its determination to stop the fighting. As differences between Syria and Jumblatt increased, the Palestinians moved to consolidate their hands with the latter's Progressive Forces. Increasingly, the Palestinians were drawn into the conflict between Syria and Jumblatt. Syria, however, would not tolerate a strong alliance between the Leftists and the Palestinians in Lebanon, which would tend to undermine its interests. On June 1, 1976, the Syrian army moved into Lebanon.

## 2. The Emergence of Syria as a Regional Factor

Securing both flanks of the Golan is, at best, a defensive move. Lebanon is not expected to become a confrontation state, and Jordan will participate in a war only if attacked. But it is nevertheless true that these initiatives have reduced Israel's options to a frontal assault across the Golan, unless broadening the conflict does not worry Israel.

The linkages being established between Syria and Jordan and between Syria and Lebanon also have important economic and political ramifications. From an economic point of view, all three countries stand to benefit from tourism, the unimpeded cross-border trade and increased employment opportunities which can, in accordance with the development plans of all three countries, help reduce the manpower drain. Lebanon, however, may yet gain the most, since a return to the status quo ante as a banking, commercial, tourist, and communication center will also benefit Syria and Jordan. Furthermore, politically these linkages will benefit all three. Jordan will no longer be singled out as the "arch-enemy" of Arab unity and will be able to play a moderating role and become the best window to the West that Syria can expect to find. Syria will be in a better position to stave off any potential challenge from Iraq, and may regain the pivotal role enjoyed by it in the Eastern part of the Arab world in the late 1940s and early 1950s.\* Lebanon, on the other hand, with its Syrian connection, will be able to achieve the Arab image which, in turn, may make more profound internal structural changes in the political/confessional system unnecessary.

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\*It is only in the eastern part of the Arab world (geographic Syria or the Fertile Crescent) that the absence of a clearly dominant state has led to a power struggle between Syria and Iraq. This power struggle is further complicated by the ideological split in the Ba'ath Party. Iraq's new-found wealth and its population--twice that of Syria--could have led to Iraq's emergence as the dominant power in the region. A Syria linked to Jordan, Lebanon, and a Palestinian entity will be in a better position to resist being dominated by Iraq.

It is perhaps the regional/international diplomatic implications of these Syrian links, and their effect on the future of an overall settlement, that are most crucial. A breakthrough in the apparently stalemated Israeli-Syrian negotiations and the Israeli-PLO impasse is now, at least, hypothetically possible. Syrian army, PLA units loyal to Syria, and Saïqah intervention in the Lebanese crisis has weakened the Rejection Front and strengthened the PLO faction seeking a settlement. It has equally placed the PLO under Syrian tutelage. Syria, therefore, holds the key to the Palestinian problem.<sup>26</sup>

Because of the Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement, a rapprochement between Jordan and the PLO can be expected. This, in turn, may allow the PLO to be amenable to participation in a reconvened Geneva Convention as part of a Jordanian delegation, or, if rapprochement has evolved into merger, as part of a Jordanian-Syrian delegation. With Syria as the guarantor, the PLO could accept an Israeli-Jordanian settlement that would restore the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan, with the understanding that elections in the West Bank and Gaza soon after would determine the political structure of the kingdom. In any case, the impasse over mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO would be sidestepped, and Israel's insistence that Jordan be the negotiator would have been met. The future of the West Bank and Gaza--whether it remains united with Jordan or becomes a separate Palestinian entity--should not pose a problem to Israel, since in any case it would be linked to the envisaged Syrian-Jordanian-Lebanese entente; and, as such, both Jordan and Syria would, in fact, take the responsibility for the behavior of that Palestinian entity and underwrite its existence. In concrete terms, such an approach would mean that this new entity would not need the trappings of a new state, i.e. an army, nor would it necessarily mean that Palestinians now living in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and other Arab states would be forced to return en masse to the West Bank and Gaza, thereby creating a lebensraum problem. Economically, this Palestinian entity would be more viable as a result of its links to the Jordanian-Lebanese-Syrian entente and would benefit from common trade, tourism, and services.

### 3. Syria and Egypt

The Lebanese crisis and the Syrian intervention in Lebanon seem to have brought Egypt and Syria together, after an estrangement which began with the Egyptian-Israeli second stage disengagement agreement. Both have had to reconsider and moderate their positions.

Initially, the Syrians set out to isolate Egypt, hoping thereby to convince that country, Israel and the United States that Egypt could not be the sole country through which the American peace initiative could be launched. Syria set out to prove that it could, despite the second stage disengagement agreement, create tensions in the area which would force Egypt to either reconsider its adherence to that disengagement agreement or be isolated. Further, it set out to prove that Egypt could not, without Syrian acquiescence, be Israel's sponsor in the Arab world. In the process, Syria found out that its intervention in Lebanon strained its resources and tainted its credibility in a number of Arab capitals. Moreover, that Israel, specifically, and the United States, in general, had to be convinced before acquiescing that the Syrian intervention was a constructive move which would enhance the chances for peace in the area. In dealing specifically with the Palestinians, Syria came to realize that it had to secure Egyptian neutrality, if not support, if it was to succeed.

The Egyptians, on the other hand, realized that there was little they could do for Lebanon in the face of a determined Syrian drive short of setting in motion a chain of events which could boomerang. The Egyptians, who initially supported the Lebanese Right when Syria was supporting the Left, shifted to side with the Left as Syria began to side with the Right. However, the Egyptians were quick to realize that a Syrian debacle in Lebanon could topple the regime of President Assad, thereby behooving them to face a new regime in Syria which was either aligned with Iraq, or worse, with Libya, both supporters of a Rejectionist policy. Thus, a compromise had to be worked out. Saudi Arabia, unhappy with the split between Egypt and Syria and fearful of the turmoil this bipolarity would engender, was the only Arab country with enough clout and acceptable to both that could act as mediator.

Although it is too early to comment on the chances of a lasting Syrian-Egyptian realignment, it is clear at this moment that the Riyadh conference of 23-24 June, attended by the foreign ministers of Egypt and Syria, did produce the necessary compromise. Egypt would accept the Syrian role in Lebanon and Syrian tutelage over the Palestinians, if it were not too drastic, in return for Syrian-Egyptian coordination on issues affecting a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Thus, Egypt, in the pursuit of peace, has the support of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the PLO with which to counteract Libya, Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, Algeria and the Soviet Union.

#### 4. The United States, West Europe, Egypt, and Syria

Although the Riyadh compromise averted a Syrian-Egyptian bipolarity with all of the serious consequent ramifications of that bipolarity for U.S. policy, the United States, nonetheless, faces a number of dilemmas: (1) it can no longer rely on Egypt alone in its pursuit of a settlement and ignore the Syrian-Jordanian-Lebanese-PLO entente; (2) it can no longer pursue territorial adjustments in the Arab-Israeli conflict without giving weight to the creation of a Palestinian entity; and (3) Egypt cannot be the only major recipient of economic and technological assistance. Given the increasingly smaller foreign aid bills, the United States will either have to give the Syrian entente a portion of what was targeted for Egypt (pleasing neither in this case), or seek European cooperation, with European aid targeted for the Syrian entente while the United States concentrates on Egypt.

France and West Germany are likely to be the two West European countries which the United States can approach in a plan involving economic assistance to the countries of the Syrian entente. Because of France's traditional links with Syria and Lebanon, because France appears anxious to be of some assistance in solving the Lebanese crisis, and because President Assad appeared anxious to demonstrate to France that he is the protector of the Lebanese Christians (having postponed his trip to France in March of 1976 when the crisis erupted anew), French economic aid to both Syria and Lebanon will be forthcoming. The West Germans, to a lesser degree (and after some consultation with Israel),

appear willing to consider a plan which involves economic aid to the countries of the Syrian entent.<sup>27</sup> United States' prodding in that direction could enhance the chances of a meaningful German economic contribution for the development of these countries.

Scenario 2

"A Syrian military intervention, but peace remains elusive."

This Scenario envisages the following:

1. Unwillingness of the Syrians to use further military pressure to bring the Leftist enclaves of Tripoli, Sidon-Aley-West Beirut, and Tyre under control;
2. The Syrians would remain militarily in place--occupation of the Bekaa, and the isolation of the above-mentioned enclaves;
3. The maintenance of close links between Lebanese Rightists and the Syrians;
4. Opening of the mountain roads from the Christian area into the Bekaa and thence into Syria;
5. A continued sea blockade and interdiction of weapons, ammunition, and fuel destined for the Leftist/Palestinian forces; and
6. Repairs to water, electrical and communication services in the enclaves remains in disarray.

This Scenario does not envisage the Arab League or some Arab states playing an effective role in mediating the differences between Rightist/Syrian-Leftist/Palestinian forces. But it does envisage continued Rightist/Syrian pressure, short of military operations, on Leftist/Palestinian forces in the latter's enclaves.

Domestic Effects: De Facto Partition

1. The Christian/Syrian-held area.
  - a. Political. Although all parties, to include Leftists, are expected to more or less adhere to the new National Covenant and deny any intention to partition Lebanon, it is clear that two or three administrations will begin to function independently from one another. Among the Christians, it will be a triumvirate of Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, and President Franjieh. In all probability, the Syrian/Christian plan will be to keep Franjieh in power until his term expires as president of Lebanon. An attempt will be made, then, to have Elias Sarkis installed in the hopes that the isolated Left will accept him in a face-saving formula to break out of their



isolation and thereby end the hostilities. Should the Left refuse to participate in the confirmation ceremonies, or should it be impossible for Parliament to convene, then Sarkis would remain the President-elect and not have his position jeopardized, since the term of Parliament has been extended for only one more year. This would clearly be a maneuver on the part of the Syrian/Rightist forces to bring about the eventual installation of Elias Sarkis, thereby keeping the constitutional process going. Fighting, of course, will continue since the new president will command no army or security forces; for the forces that are presently fighting in Lebanon act independently of his constitutional powers. The political reforms described in the first Scenario would continue to be the basis of the Rightist platform for a new Lebanon, although the economic/military situation as described in this Scenario would favor the Christians, who would be less inclined toward additional compromises in an effort to placate the Left. In the Bekaa area, where the Syrian army is maintaining law and order, Imam Musa Sadr would constitute the political authority and would also be expected, at least verbally, to adhere to the new National Covenant and would support the installation of Sarkis.

b. Military. The reconstitution of the Lebanese army would remain a moot issue. The Syrians would continue to try to attract former Lebanese soldiers and officers to their "Vanguards of the Lebanese Arab Army." If they are successful in attracting sufficient numbers, it can be expected that the "Vanguards" would operate in Syrian-controlled areas and would constitute the nucleus of the security forces which could be placed at the disposal of Elias Sarkis if he is installed. Elias Sarkis may, in turn, develop this security force into a new Lebanese army through the aegis of the former Nahj officers. Thus, it could serve the purpose of excluding undesirable elements, such as Ahmad Khatib or Antoine Barakat, without having to take a decision concerning these men or others who defected and joined one side or the other.

With the clearing of the Christian-held area and the Bekaa of Leftists and Palestinians, the front lines are likely to stabilize. The dividing line in Beirut would remain, with sporadic fighting continuing. The Beirut

to Damascus road as far as Sofar will constitute a dividing line also, separating the two areas, with occasional fighting taking place. Not much fighting is expected in the heartland of the Christian redoubts, although military preparedness would continue as a first priority.

c. Economic. With the opening of the mountain roads from the Christian heartland into the Bekaa and from there to Syria, supplies and limited trade will begin alleviating the deprivation of the Christian-held area. These roads are expected to facilitate the movement of goods and people to and from Syria for eight months of the year. In winter, the maritime lines to Cyprus will provide the needed supplies and transit facilities. Although conditions in the Christian area will be far from normal, the quality of life in this area will improve drastically.

The banks would continue to operate through their branches and affiliates in Arab and European capitals, with Damascus providing the necessary telecommunications back-up. In a sense, those Lebanese banks which have established branches in Amman would benefit most since distances between the Christian-held area and Jordan are minimal. In other words, a number of Lebanese in the Christian-held area who have access to Damascus and Amman will use Amman as a safe haven for monies needed for trade in the Arab world and as a transfer point to European countries and/or the United States. Lebanon, however, will not resume its place as a banking center under this Scenario, but would be relegated to branch status, while headquarters are moved elsewhere.

d. Social reforms. The reforms mentioned in the first Scenario would not be implemented in the absence of a functioning national government, and the different regional leaders will have the choice of allocating whatever meager resources they may have in order to alleviate the most pressing needs. In all probability, hospital and public health services would be those most emphasized in the Christian-held area, while schools and aid to farmers would become the primary concern of Imam Musa Sadr in the Bekaa.

## 2. The Leftist/Palestinian-held areas

a. Political. As in the Christian/Syrian-held areas, the Leftist/Palestinian leaders in all probability will continue to deny

partition as an objective and would continue to support most of the reforms described in the new National Covenant. Nonetheless, power in these areas would be in the hands of Kamal Jumblatt and Yasser Arafat, who may establish administrative bureaucracies of their own.

The Leftist/Palestinian forces will face a dilemma when President Franjieh's term of office comes to an end. They can come to terms with Elias Sarkis and use his installation as a face-saving formula which would enable them to reach an understanding with the Syrians; or they could refuse to accept him until such time as an agreement is reached with the Rightist/Syrian forces, amenable to their desires. Much will depend on the military and economic situation and the presence or absence of effective Arab support. At the moment of writing, this kind of accommodation appears unlikely, and thus, one has to project that Elias Sarkis will remain president-elect until such time as conditions favor settlement of the crisis, especially since Sarkis has made it known that he wants to be president of all Lebanese and not just of one faction.

As part of the pressure, which is resulting in adverse economic conditions, civilians in these enclaves will begin to leave for safer havens, which in this case will be either the Bekaa, Syria or Tyre.<sup>28</sup> This kind of population migration will tend to weaken the Leftist/Palestinian leaders by depriving them of their "water"\* and strengthen potential pro-Syrian leaders among them, since living in the Bekaa or Syria will ipso facto mean a shift of allegiance. Kamal Jumblatt, especially, may find himself being challenged by new Druze leaders, such as the Talhouks and the Ala'muddins. In all probability, pressure on Kamal Jumblatt from his Druze constituency will be increasing as conditions continue to deteriorate. His Druze constituency will probably demand that he either come to terms with the Syrians and split from the Palestinians or leave the country and make room for Druze leaders who could reach an accommodation with Syria.

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\* Reference is made to Chariman Mao's comments on guerrilla warfare in which support comes from the people or "water".

b. Military. The cessation of military pressure by Syrians and Christians would give the Leftists a much needed respite. However, once a military venture of this nature winds down, desertions are likely to increase. Therefore, it will become more difficult to find recruits, especially if the civilian population of these enclaves have migrated to Syria, the Bekaa, or the Tyre region. Furthermore, the Palestinians, having suffered the most casualties, will find it difficult to draw upon the reserves on which they normally could count from Syria and Jordan. Thus, their posture will remain weak. Therefore, given the high casualty rate among the Leftist/Palestinian forces, the desertions, the interdiction of ammunition and war materiel, and the destruction of the oil refinery at Sidon, it is clear that the Leftist/Palestinian forces could not regain the initiative.

c. Economic. The economic situation in the enclaves will continue to worsen to the point where all forms of trade will cease. Even grocery stores and bakeries will be forced to shut down for lack of supplies. "In Bourj Abu Haidar, one of the most populous [Muslim] quarters, a grocer, his shelves empty except for a few packages of spaghetti and some soap, explained that he used to rent a truck for \$15 to drive to southern Lebanon to buy merchandise. Today, a truck costs \$100 a day, if he can find one."<sup>29</sup> The shop keeper went on to say that his customers "could not afford the prices, he would have to charge" and so he was closing his business.

As civilians leave their areas because of this deterioration, presumably taking their money with them, the banks in these areas, which had continued to function, will also shut down for lack of personnel and the needed banking capital to justify continued operation. Thus, the enclaves are likely to turn into ghettos.

d. Social reforms. No social reforms are possible, given the prevailing situation in the enclaves.

#### Regional and Systemic Effects

##### 1. Syria and the Palestinians

The Syrians' objective in this Scenario is to split the Leftists from the Palestinians, thereby weakening the former and forcing the latter to accept Syrian tutelage. In this case, and as a compromise,

it is likely that the Syrians will agree to Yasser Arafat remaining as head of the PLO, in exchange for PLO adherence to the proposed unified Syrian/Palestinian military command. Thus, the Syrians will have achieved their Eastern Front objective but would have fallen short of replacing Palestinian leadership with one that is truly pro-Syrian. In this case, Zuhair Muhsin is not expected to replace Yasser Arafat as head of the PLO, although Saiqah will dominate the Palestinian movement in Lebanon.

Furthermore, Syria will not be able to bring about rapprochement between the PLO and Jordan, and thus will not be in a position to deliver the Palestinians to a Geneva Conference or some other international conference to settle the Palestinian question. This may prompt the Jordanians to reassess their relationship with Syria to the extent that they may show a renewed interest in direct contacts with Israel vis-a-vis an eventual arrangement of the West Bank issue.

The Palestinians on the other hand would have survived and could begin to maneuver again between those Arab states supporting the "Rejectionist" line and those favoring a peace settlement. In other words, the PLO will have to be represented at a peace conference as the sole representative of, and negotiator for, the Palestinian people.

## 2. Other

Reassessment by Jordan of its position vis-a-vis Syria will have the effect of strengthening Iraq in its competition with Syria for leadership of the region and will probably result in closer relations between that country and Saudi Arabia.

Egypt, as a result of the Jordanian reassessment, will emerge anew as the pivotal Arab country in the settling of the Arab-Israeli conflict

United States-Western European interest in Syria, in the absence of a Syrian/Jordanian/Lebanese entente, will decrease, since the Syrian regime will be unable to bring the Palestinians to the conference table. However, support will be given to the Assad regime so long as its moderate stance continues.

Scenario 3

"Regional intervention, resulting from an Arab League Conference or an Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting"

This Scenario envisages:

1. The reluctance by Rightist forces to the stationing of troops other than Syrian in Lebanon;

2. The retreat of Syrian forces into the Bekaa area, as demanded by the Leftists;

3. The postioning of Arab League forces between the combatants following the main dividing line that roughly goes from the port of Beirut to the Avenue Bshara al-Khoury to the old Beirut-Damascus road as far as Zahleh; and

4. The holding of discussion among all parties to the conflict.

Domestic Effects: De Jure Partition

1. Political. All participants will attend the conference designed to settle the Lebanese crisis, and will claim adherence to an unpartitioned Lebanon. Furthermore, most will be supportive of the new National Covenant; but differences will necessarily arise since both factions have fall-back positions. In the absence of a powerful internal or external force which could impose a compromise, it is likely that no agreement will be reached on a number of issues, such as secularization versus laicization, the reconstitution of a Lebanese army, and the Palestinian presence and role in Lebanon.

Most likely the Christians will demand either the maintenance of the confessional system as embodied in the new National Covenant, or total secularization of the State. The hopes of the Christians in falling back on this hard-line position are:

- a. That a fight will erupt between the Shi'a and Sunnis over the number of representatives which each community will have in the new Parliament. The Sunnis are slated to maintain a 24 to 22 majority over the Shi'ites and, with some Syrian support, the Shi'a may demand equality.

- b. That the Muslims will reject total secularization, since it will mean the abolition of religious courts and the personal status laws, which follow the internal dictates of the religions concerned.

The Christians, because of the question of secularization, will be in a better position to push either of two proposals which will affect the future of Lebanon: federation or confederation. In the Lebanese context, a clear distinction is made between a confederation and a federation. Federation implies union between separate independent states, such as was undertaken by Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen under the UAR; confederation is viewed as a union between various regions of a country. In a confederation, there would be one army, one foreign policy and a dominant central government; but in a federation each state will have its own army, its own laws, its own government, with a weak central federal administrative structure.

The confederal concept being considered will split Lebanon into three "statelets": Mount Lebanon (Byblos, Koura, Bshirre, Zghorta, part of the Akkar, Zahleh, and Jezzine), North Lebanon (Tripoli, Myneh, part of the Akkar, the Hermel, Baalbek, and north Lebanon), and South Lebanon (western Bekaa, Hasbaya, Rashaya, the Teen Valley, and all of south Lebanon with the exception of Jezzine). Beirut, which would be the seat of the confederate government, will have a special legal status. Each statelet would have a prime minister, a government, and a municipal council. The confederation government of Beirut will be composed of municipal, social, and sectarian councils, with each religious sect having two representatives on the sectarian council. All three councils will have the legal power to look into the constitutionality of laws. Beirut, furthermore, will have its own governor. A confederal legislative council is also envisaged, with one representative for every 25,000 citizens. At the confederal government level, too, each statelet will be represented by three ministers. Finally, a confederal army would be created, with each statelet "providing a certain number of soldiers."<sup>30</sup>

In all probability the Christian Rightists would favor a federation. The principal reasons for opting for this governmental system are numerous. The reconstitution of the army along confederal lines would make it predominantly Christian. The Christians, being the wealthiest Lebanese group will be called upon to contribute the largest amount toward the social

and economic development of the other two statelets without benefiting proportionally from such contributions. Moreover, the question of Arab sponsorship of these statelets will play an important part in the Christian decision. Since a Syrian withdrawal would be a result of Arab pressure, it could be assumed that Iraq and Libya would sponsor the South Lebanon statelet, a sponsorship that would be totally unacceptable to the Christians with their strong relationships with Syria. Then, too, the continued presence of Palestinians in either the North Lebanon or South Lebanon statelets, freed from the constraints of the Cairo Accords, will also be unacceptable to the Christians. Finally, the Christians will favor federation because it will mean continued isolation of the southern region.

Federation still would envisage union among the three statelets, but each would have its own army, its own government, its own laws, and its own municipal councils. A unified foreign policy and foreign representation, however, may be pursued. Under this federal plan, the armies of the Rightist and Leftist factions would be turned into statelet armies, and the present Rightist and Leftist leaders will be the ruling elites in their respective statelets. In the northern region, the dominant elite would be the Shi'ite element, headed by Musa Sadr, whose relations with Syria are symmetrical to those of the Christians.

The Muslim Leftists and their Palestinian allies would, in all probability, prefer a confederal set up, but would not be in a position to enforce it, nor would they consider enforcing it if they could because of the formidable Christian-Shi'ite alliance. Regardless, the secular issue would not be a factor, since the Sunnis and Shi'ites of North and South Lebanon will reject the proposal made by Kamal Jumblatt to make Lebanon a secular state.

2. Military. The reconstitution of a Lebanese army as envisaged in the first Scenario is not likely to occur. In the case of a confederacy, each party will contribute a certain number of soldiers and officers. This will lead to de facto imposition in the army of confession- alism, since the allegiance of the soldiers will be to their region (the statelets), and not to the confederal government. In the case of the



federal system, there will be three separate armies, whose rank and file will be drawn from the members of the former Lebanese army, and therefore, will, de facto and de jure, consecrate the confessional breakdown.

3. Economic. The ties of the Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon statelets to Syria and, through Syria to Jordan and the world, will probably lead to a faster rehabilitation and reconstruction of these two regions than would take place in South Lebanon. These two regions, in fact, will benefit more from the Syrian/Jordanian entente than would South Lebanon. South Lebanon, with links to Iraq and Libya, may receive more economic aid than the other two statelets, but its development would be slower since that region is the least developed.

Banking will resume in a Beirut that will be either the capital of a federated or a confederated state. The banks' branches, though, in the three regions, will expand to equal or surpass central headquarters in Beirut. What will happen is that the central Beirut headquarters will be used for international trade, while the branches will attract the day-to-day transactions. In a federal system it is expected that the branches in either Ashrafieh, Jounieh, or Byblos will, in fact, become the principal headquarters, since the Christians are more likely to enact the kind of liberal banking laws that international banks seem to want, and the quality of life in these areas also will be more attractive to foreigners.

4. Social reforms. In a confederated set up, an equitable social development plan is likely to be hindered by considerations mentioned above. In a federal system, each region will determine its own priorities. The Mount Lebanon statelet is more apt to be the most advanced, since it has been the primary beneficiary of previous Lebanese Christian-dominated regimes.

5. The Palestinians. Although the PLO will have lost control of Palestinian camps in Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon and will not be able to readily call upon its Palestinian resources in Syria and Jordan, nonetheless, it is a fact that most of the leadership will remain in

tact and will not be replaced as a result of Syrian pressure and intervention. Yasser Arafat will continue as head of the PLO and will not be replaced by Zuhair Muhsin. However, challenges from within the guerrilla ranks are expected. Since it is already obvious from a number of Palestinian pronouncements that serious tactical and strategic mistakes were committed by the leadership, it is likely that new faces will emerge, and these will tend to be more radical than the present leaders.

6. The Lebanese Left. Kamal Jumblatt and other prominent Leftist leaders, by the interjection of Arab forces, will be able to survive in the South Lebanon statelet. Here, too, though, challenges will be forthcoming from both the Druze and Sunni communities, which will suffer because of the isolation of the southern Lebanon statelet in either a confederation or a federation. The program of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which among other points includes a secular state, will not be enforceable, although a socialist regime may emerge since the southern Lebanon statelet is the least developed, has the highest concentration of Lebanese communists, and has the PSP as the major political party whose leaders favor socialist egalitarianism.

#### Regional and Systemic Effects

1. As explained in the second Scenario, Syria will no longer provide the only key to a Palestinian solution. It will be unable to deliver the Palestinians to a conference held to determine the fate of the Palestinians. Instead, Egypt once again will have a say in determining their future and will formulate, with the Syrians, a settlement policy.

2. Bipolarity in the Middle East in this Scenario will not emerge. Both Syria and Egypt will be forced to cooperate in any future settlement plan. This point was made in the previous Scenario.

3. Lebanon will not emerge as a support state. The Eastern Front envisaged by Syria in Scenario 1 will not be completed since the Lebanese army will not be reconstituted according to Syrian plan and the Syrian/Jordanian/Lebanese entente will have been shaken. Nonetheless, it is expected that, in a federal system of government, the Syrians will equip the armies of Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon to enable them to resist

any military pressure which may arise from the South Lebanon statelet, which, in turn, will have close links with Iraq and Libya.

4. Lebanon's links with Syria will not be uniform. Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon will develop a form of psychological, economic, and military dependency upon Syria. Further, these two statelets will depend upon Syria for their security. Trade, commerce, and tourism between these two statelets and Syria will increase, and one should expect the port of Tripoli to become the principal port which will serve Syria, providing it special facilities in terms of free zones, interstate transit rights, etc. The association, therefore, of the Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon statelets with Syria will be beneficial to all parties concerned and will be at the expense of the South Lebanon statelet, which will have few relations with its more powerful neighbor to the East.

5. The effects of the developments described above on the systemic will be negligible. Syria will continue to be of interest to the United States only so long as a moderate Damascus regime remains interested in a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Americans, in turn, continue to pursue an initiative in a settlement.

6. Aid in the form of financial assistance will be forthcoming from a variety of sources. Mount Lebanon will, in all probability, receive aid from France, West Germany, the Vatican, and to a lesser extent, from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. North Lebanon will, in all probability, receive aid from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait; whereas South Lebanon will benefit from Libyan, Iraqi, and to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti assistance. The United States is expected to try to be even-handed, and thus, will aid all three regional statelets. The Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon statelets, however, can be expected to receive the lion's share of private international investments, since they can provide the services, facilities and social climate which the international and multinational corporations require.

#### Scenario 4A

"A Syrian withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, because of internal and external pressure on Syria, results in the Leftist/Palestinian forces, with renewed Iraqi and Libyan support, gaining the initiative, and through military action, seriously threaten the Rightist/Christian strongholds, thereby creating the fear of a Leftist/Palestinian takeover of Lebanon and the implications it will have for Israel's northern border. The border threat, coupled with the links of the Leftists/Palestinians with the Rejectionist Arab states, encourages Israel to intervene militarily. Israeli troops occupy southern Lebanon through a limited engagement, culminating in international intervention through the United Nations."

It must be presumed that in this Scenario, a general Arab-Israeli war is not desirable for all parties concerned and, therefore, a fifth Arab-Israeli war does not ensue. It must also be assumed that the United Nations will demand the pull back of Israeli troops and that Israel will agree, on the condition that all non-Lebanese forces are withdrawn from Lebanon; and a United Nations force is placed on the Syrian/Lebanese/Israeli border, empowered to supervise the withdrawal of non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon.

#### Domestic Effects

1. A cease-fire is imposed.

It is very likely that both factions will heed a call for a cease-fire, since none of the parties want to appear supportive of Israeli "aggression." To induce the Christian/Rightists to accept a cease-fire, the Leftist forces will agree to president-elect Sarkis being installed as president, as soon as President Franjieh resigns. The Christian/Rightist forces will, in an effort to appear conciliatory, put pressure on President Franjieh, since the installation of Elias Sarkis, their candidate, will be seen as a favorable turn of events.

2. The Lebanese Left and Right agree to the new National Covenant. The new president is likely to call for a round table conference to

discuss the formation of a government of national emergency, and to select a foreign minister, to be dispatched to the United Nations where he will coordinate the Lebanese position with that of the Arab states.

Both the Right and the Left will attend the conference and accept the Christian demand that the new National Covenant form the basis of an understanding of reconciliation among all factions. The Christian demand will be accepted, since the presence and purpose of Israeli troops in southern Lebanon will be well understood by the Left, and refusal by the Left to compromise may result in further Israeli advances, culminating in the partial occupation of most of the territory forming the stronghold of the Leftist/Palestinian forces, to include Sidon. Also, since the initial Israeli thrust will have weakened the Leftist/Palestinian forces, it is unlikely that the Leftist/Palestinian faction will want to be caught between a Christian hammer and an Israeli anvil. Furthermore, the Palestinians will have to agree to Israeli demands that their forces be withdrawn from Lebanon, since it appears that the Israeli intervention will not lead to a general war.

3. Most actors agree to the presence of French military forces under the aegis of the United Nations to maintain law and order until the Lebanese security forces and army are reconstituted along the lines of the compromise agreement.

Since the withdrawal of Palestinian forces, and in the absence of a Lebanese army and security force to maintain law and order, and in the hopes that the French military presence will protect the Left now that it is deprived of its Palestinian ally, the Lebanese Leftists will agree to the stationing of French forces in Beirut and along the flash points. In all probability, the Lebanese army will then be reconstituted along the lines of the compromise reached in Scenario 1. Some important differences in this Scenario to the previous one are that the Syrians will have less say in the selection of those officers that would have been assigned to sensitive posts, the size of the new Lebanese army (less than 45,000), and strategy and armament.

4. Palestinian camps and control of these camps in Lebanon.

With the fighting elements of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon withdrawn, the question of who will control these camps will have to be resolved. Most likely, they will initially be controlled by United Nations forces stationed in Lebanon, until such time as Lebanese security forces can assume control as they did prior to the Cairo Accord. The compromise between Left and Right on this issue will be easier to reach since most of the Palestinian camps in the Christian strongholds already have been overrun and the others rendered impotent, as a result of the Syrian military intervention. The Christians most likely will agree to a Leftist demand that the security forces controlling the camps be under the direct command of the president.

5. Redistribution of wealth in favor of Sunni and Shi'ite regions.

This topic was amply covered previously in Scenario 1.

6. Greater government control of the economic banking and business institutions.

This topic was covered previously in Scenario 1.

7. The press would be controlled.

This topic was fully covered in Scenario 1.

Regional and Systemic Effects

1. The Eastern Front.

Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory, when coupled with the withdrawal of all Palestinian forces to include Saigah, and the stationing of United Nations troops on the Israel-Lebanon border, frustrates the Syrian plan for an Eastern Front stretching from Ras an-Nakoura to Aqaba. Also, the fact that the size of the Lebanese army will probably not reach the Syrian desired level of 45,000, and that the Syrians will not have as great a say in the selection of Lebanese officers, means that the ability of Syria to use Lebanon as a deterrent on the basis of the size of its army and its equipment and the willingness of its officers to cooperate will be greatly reduced.

2. Syria and the Palestinians.

In all probability, elements of the PLA will be redeployed to their

former points of departure: Ayn Jallut Brigade to Egypt, Qadisiyya to Jordan, and the Hittin Brigade to Syria; the DPFLP and PFLP-GC forces will probably be stationed in Syria, since the leaders of these groups tended to be pro-Syrian and reluctantly joined Fatah after the Syrian intervention; Saiqah, under Syrian control from the beginning, will return to its bases in Syria, too; the remnants of the ALF will, in all probability, journey to Iraq. The PFLP and Fatah pose a greater problem. The remaining forces of the PFLP will not be allowed to enter Syria while Fatah forces will be permitted only if Yasser Arafat agrees to strict Syrian control. Therefore, the PFLP probably will move to either Iraq or Libya, with the latter as a more likely choice, while Fatah leadership will accede to Syrian demands. Fatah headquarters, though, will be moved to Cairo. In essence, therefore, Syria will have achieved control over most of the Palestinians and will be in a position to pursue its policy of reconciling the PLO/Fatah with Jordan in preparation for a peace conference. The presence of the ALF in Iraq and the PFLP in Libya increases the capabilities of these two countries to undertake activities which will be aimed at preventing a peace conference and threaten those Arab leaders who favor such a peace conference. Thus, a limited wave of regional and international terrorist acts can be anticipated.

### 3. The Syrian/Jordanian Entente.

The Syrian/Jordanian entente is not likely to be shaken by the turn of events in Lebanon and the subsequent non-completion of the Eastern Front. Since Syria will emerge from the crisis with most of the Palestinian forces under its control, and with its intention to sponsor a PLO/Fatah-Jordanian reconciliation, cooperation between Jordan and Syria is likely to continue. The credibility, however, of the Eastern Front will be greatly jeopardized, and military cooperation between the two countries most likely will be curtailed.

### 4. Lebanon and the Syrian/Jordanian Entente.

The Lebanese, and especially the Christians and Shi'ites, will continue to cooperate with the regime of Hafez Assad, since psychologically both the Christians and the Shi'ites are dependent on Syria for their security. Also, cooperation is likely to continue since the economic realities of a war-ravaged Lebanon dictate cooperation

in such fields as tourism, construction, transit rights, and trade. Finally, the installation of Elias Sarkis as president and his pro-Syrian attitude and that of the former members of the Nahj, will guarantee good relations with Syria.

5. The Lebanese crisis at the United Nations.

Although it is understood that the Israeli intervention would not result in a fifth Arab-Israeli war, and that Israel would pull back if conditions were met, the Arab states would, in an effort to save face and induce the Palestinians into withdrawing their forces from Lebanon to comply with Israeli demands, insist that the whole Arab-Israeli issue, especially the Palestinian problem and Israeli colonization of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and the El-Arish areas, be discussed anew. To the extent that Syria may have been able to effect a reconciliation between the PLO/Fatah and Jordan, this could be a propitious time to have peace initiatives resume, especially when it appears that the question of mutual PLO-Israel recognition will have been side-stepped and that Jordan, thus, would be able to act as a negotiator for the Palestinians. If Syria cannot effect the reconciliation between the PLO/Fatah and Jordan, it appears that Israel will agree to a recognition of the newly-elected West Bank Palestinian leaders as temporary valid negotiators for all the Palestinians, in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from some parts of the Golan as a prelude to a full peace conference, at which all parties, then, could be seated. In other words, the presence of United Nations troops on the Lebanese-Israeli and Israeli-Syrian frontiers will not complicate the issue, but rather, will give Israel a greater sense of security.

6. International economic assistance.

Lebanon probably will benefit most from this turn of events in terms of economic assistance. France, because of its historic links with Lebanon and the presence of its troops on Lebanese soil, would be able to assist Lebanon the most. Iraqi and Libyan aid also will be forthcoming, although in a curtailed fashion to ensure that the Lebanese government, and especially the Christians, adhere to the new National Covenant. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, because of their investments



in Lebanon and because of an interest in having that country resume its position as a banking, commercial, and service center, will also contribute. The Shah of Iran has stated that he, too, will contribute, with the understanding that the money will go for the economic and social development of areas predominantly inhabited by Shi'ites.

Syria and the Syrian/Jordanian entente also will be the focus of French and West German assistance. The economic subsidies from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will be resumed and, because of the good relations that now exist between Hafez Assad and King Hussein and the Shah, some economic assistance will be forthcoming from Iran. The United States, in an attempt to keep an even-handed policy, also will feel compelled to contribute to Lebanon and the Syria/Jordanian entente, to the slight detriment of Egypt, but not at the level as projected in Scenario 1.

#### Scenario 4B

"The conditions which led to an Israeli intervention in Scenario 4A are presumed to apply to Scenario 4B, with the exception that Israel refuses to withdraw from Lebanese territory as demanded by the United Nations. It is also presumed in this Scenario that the Israeli advance will be to the Litani River, which corresponds to the yet to be defined Israeli Red Line."

#### Domestic Effects

The effects of an Israeli advance to the Litani River will be similar to those discussed in Scenario 4A (Domestic Effects) but will differ on several points. In the first place, the guerrilla forces will not have to agree to evacuate Lebanon and will be concentrated in the area between the Litani River and the Beirut-Damascus road, thereby constituting a first-line of defense. Secondly, the Israeli unwillingness to evacuate Lebanon will put the Christians in a quandary. Although the Israeli invasion will have relieved pressure on them, it would be difficult for the Maronites to publicly acquiesce to a permanent or quasi-permanent Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory. This inability to publicly acquiesce will, in turn, make reconciliation between the opposing factions in the Lebanese crisis easier since Israel will once more be the country on which all Arabs seem to agree--the common enemy. The Christians, further, will be unable to demand that the Palestinians evacuate Lebanon or even abide by the Cairo Accords of 1969, so long as they have publicly accepted the fact that Israel is an aggressor.

Moreover, the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon will ipso facto turn Lebanon into a confrontation state. This will mean that Lebanon most likely will have to accept partnership in any future Arab-Israeli conflict. The effect of this factor on the domestic front also will facilitate reconciliation between Christians and Muslims since it will have fulfilled another of the Muslim demands. Nonetheless, the Christians will be in a better position to secure for themselves minimal

changes in the political structure of the country since their cooperation will be deemed necessary by the Muslims.

It must be pointed out, however, that the Maronites will secretly be quite pleased with the Israeli occupation, since it will reduce the number of Muslims in a newly delineated Lebanon minus its southern extremity and therefore give the Maronites a majority. The Maronites, furthermore, will blame the invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon on the Palestinians and the Arab Rejectionist Front.

Although it is expected that a refugee problem may arise from an Israeli occupation, those refugees who will move north mainly will be Palestinians located in and around Tyre. Since the Lebanese of southern Lebanon appear to be receptive to the limited Israeli "open door" policy initiated during the past few months, a large number may opt to remain, especially if Israel encourages them to do so; and it will be to Israel's interest to encourage them to stay, since an anticipated resumption of Palestinian guerrilla activity across the Litani River will have to target the Lebanese population of southern Lebanon before it can reach the Israeli settlements in northern Israel. In other words, Israel will seek to turn the Lebanese population of southern Lebanon to its advantage the way they have done so with the Druze population of Israel.

The Christians most likely will not allow Palestinian or Muslim Lebanese refugees to cross into their enclave of Mount Lebanon, thereby creating a form of de facto partition. They will probably use the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon to strengthen their enclave by encouraging the Christians residing in the area situated between the Litani River and the Beirut-Damascus road to emigrate. Then, too the occupation of southern Lebanon will be used as an excuse to move most industries and commerce/ banking northward because of the proximity of Beirut and the area between the Litani River and the Beirut-Damascus road to Israeli retaliatory raids.

1. Political. The Christians will probably attempt to formalize the de facto partition by suggesting federation or confederation similar to what was presented in Scenario 3 (Domestic Effects; Political).

2. Military. The Christians most likely will use the Israeli occupation as justification for the creation of an army composed of home or territorial guard units. In other words, they will suggest that the existing militias be constituted as territorial guards, since these militias have been and will be recruited from their respective Christians and Muslim areas, and because of their knowledge of their own terrain, will be better able to defend it against anticipated Israeli attacks. Most likely this proposal will be agreed to by the Leftists/Palestinians and Muslims, but especially the Palestinians, since it will afford them a greater degree of freedom to continue to operate against Israel than would an integrated Lebanese army. A compromise will be made and accepted by both factions regarding coordination. Coordination between these two territorial armies will be made at higher headquarters, brigade or army levels, for the purposes of general policy, strategy, and arms acquisitions.

#### Regional and Systemic Effects

1. Syria and Israel. In general the Israeli invasion of Lebanon will weaken the regime of Hafez Assad and compel him to seek reconciliation with the Rejectionists. However, Syrian reaction to an Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon will depend on whether the Israelis occupy all of the region, or whether the Israelis occupy only the littoral and the southern extension of the Lebanon (the mountain ranges) thereby leaving the southern extremity of the Bekaa and the Lebanese slopes of Mount Hermon as a no man's land between the Israeli and Syrian armies. In the first instance, the Syrians will be presented with a serious military problem since total occupation will enable Israeli forces to flank the Syrian defenses in the Golan. The military threat will be judged to be so great by the Syrians that they may have to acquiesce to the positioning of Iraqi troops in Syria, an act which will not only present problems for the Syrian Ba'ath but will also greatly increase tension in that area, since Israel is not likely to relish Iraqi troops on its border.

In the second instance, with the establishment of a no man's land, the Syrians may have more time in which to maneuver diplomatically between

Iraq and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Egypt and the United States on the other.

2. Syria and Jordan. The effects of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon on the envisaged Syrian-Jordanian entente will be positive and reinforcing, especially in the second instance mentioned above, since Syria will attempt to use King Hussein's good offices to seek United States pressure on Israel for withdrawal. It will in a sense give Hussein much greater say in matters affecting the Syrian-Jordanian entente and will enable him to become a greater moderating influence, especially if it appears that the United States is responding to Hussein's appeal for action. King Hussein's future, in fact, will depend very much on United States action, since inaction will gradually propel Syria into the arms of Iraq which, in turn, means trouble for Jordan.

3. Syria and Egypt. Syria will have to draw closer to Egypt in either of the above instances, since it will need Egypt and Egyptian good offices to seek United States pressure for an Israeli withdrawal or Egyptian military participation in a fifth war should events deteriorate drastically. The Sadat regime will, in turn, be weakened if the United States fails to secure Israel's withdrawal since it will signal to the Egyptians the inability or unwillingness of the United States to exert the necessary pressure, not only to secure an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon but also an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Pressure by the Egyptian military circles on the Sadat regime to restore good relations with the Soviet Union will intensify and will be solidly based on the argument that Egypt has to arm itself in an attempt to liberate its Israeli-occupied territory now that the United States appears unwilling or unable to pressure Israel into greater concessions. As a first step, Egypt must seek a rapprochement with Libya as a means of tapping into Soviet weaponry and spare parts now in the Libyan arsenal.

4. The Palestinians. The Israeli move into and occupation of southern Lebanon will once more enhance the position of the PLO since Syria and, to a lesser extent, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, will have to strengthen them in case of the possibility of a fifth Arab-Israeli confrontation. The

Palestinians themselves will use the Israeli occupation as justification for their struggle against that state, and will use the Lebanese situation to seek greater support for themselves in the Third World countries and the Eastern Bloc. The Rejectionists among the Palestinians will be strengthened and a renewed wave of world-wide terrorism must be expected.

5. The United States and Western Europe. It can be expected that both the United States and Western Europe will be greatly affected by the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon and the resultant threat of a possible fifth Arab-Israeli war. Western Europe, and especially France, will demand the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, and may go along with an anticipated call by Arab states at the Security Council for sanctions against Israel. The United States may find it difficult to balance its refusal to accede to a call for sanctions and its role as an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A refusal to go along with sanctions as a means of pressuring Israel will be perceived by the Arabs as the end of American "even handedness," thereby seriously jeopardizing the recent gains made by the United States in the Arab world. But a United States acceptance of sanctions surely will antagonize Israel, and render it more unwilling to consider further retreat from Arab occupied territories. It may deprive the United States of whatever leverage it now has over Israel, especially if the government of Prime Minister Rabin falls and is replaced by an Israeli government of national unity in which the Likud and the Mapai hawks will come to exercise a greater influence.

On the other hand, one has to expect that Israel will not withdraw from Lebanon as a result of United Nations pressure, but may agree to do so in return for greater United States aid.

FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 16 (19 April 1976), p. 2.
- <sup>2</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 14 (5 April 1976), p. 1.
- <sup>3</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 16 (19 April 1976), p. 2.
- <sup>4</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 7 (16 February 1976), p. 1.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>6</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, "Chronology," Vol. 7, No. 6 (9 February 1976),  
p. 1.
- <sup>7</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, "Chronology," Vol. 7, No. 9 (1 March 1976),  
p. 1.
- <sup>8</sup> An Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 6, No. 49 (8 December 1975), p. 3.
- <sup>9</sup> Washington Post, May 29, 1976, p. A-9; An-Nahar Arab Report,  
"Chronology," Vol. 7, No. 23 (7 June 1976), p. 2.
- <sup>10</sup> Interview by P. Jureidini with a former member of the Lebanese  
Duexieme Bureau.
- <sup>11</sup> Ash-Sharq (Beirut), 22 April 1976, p. 3.
- <sup>12</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 24 (14 June 1976), p. 2.
- <sup>13</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, "Economics & Oil," Vol. 7, No. 6  
(9 February 1976), p. 1.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 2.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>17</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, "Economics & Oil," Vol. 7, No. 11 (15 March 1976),  
p. 2.
- <sup>18</sup> Elias ad-Dirry, "Elias Sarkis: The Heir-Apparent to the Era of  
the Amir," An-Nahar Files, No. 9 (in Arabic), An-Nahar Publishing House,  
1970, np.
- <sup>19</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, "Economics & Oil," Vol. 7, No. 11 (15 March 1976),  
p. 2.
- <sup>20</sup> Ad-Dirry, Op. Cit.
- <sup>21</sup> Discussions by P. Jureidini with Lebanese businessmen in Lebanon,  
Syria, Jordan, and Paris, France.
- <sup>22</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 2 (12 January 1976), p. 1.

- <sup>23</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, "Chronology," Vol. 7, No. 3 (19 January 1976),  
p. 1.
- <sup>24</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 7 (16 February 1976), p. 1.
- <sup>25</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 13 (29 March 1976), p. 2.
- <sup>26</sup> An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 6 (9 February 1976), pp. 1-2.
- <sup>27</sup> Based on discussions between P. Jureidini and Bonn, West German  
officials.
- <sup>28</sup> New York Times, July 12, 1976, p. 6.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> The Middle East, "Moves Toward Confederation," No. 20 (19 June 1976),  
pp. 1-2.